Social and Economic Inequality

Although many factors may cause social and economic inequality in a society, one of notable importance is the discrimination faced by minority groups. This is seen in income disparities across racial, ethnic and gender group boundaries. According to United States census data (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0685.pdf), the median income of white males in 2007 was $35,141 compared to $25,822 and $24,451 for African American and Hispanic males, respectively. This differential is even greater than that for females because of large pay differentials between men and women that reduce ethnic disparities. Comparable figures for women were $21,069, $19,752, and $16,748, respectively. Moreover, these differences are not due to different levels of educational attainment. Pay differentials exist across all educational levels.

Differences in income are also reflected in the number of people living under poverty thresholds (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0695.pdf). In 2007, 10.5% of whites lived in poverty compared to 24.5% of African Americans and 21.5% of Hispanics. Household wealth reflects similar differences. Median net worth of whites in 2007 was $170,400 compared to $27,800 for non-whites and Hispanics (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0705.pdf).

It would be reasonable to expect that such disparities primarily harm those at the low end of the economic ladder, and indeed the poor show disadvantages not only economically but along a host of other measures of social inequality and general wellbeing. But according to Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), as conveyed in their book The Spirit Level, income inequality does not only affect the poor; it adversely affects people at all levels of income within a society. They gathered data from a large array of government, non-government organizational, and scientific sources in studying the relationship of income inequality to a variety of measures of wellbeing within democratic, modern industrialized countries, including more than a dozen European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Singapore, Australia, new Zealand and Israel. Additionally, they looked at these relationships across the fifty states in the U.S.

Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) showed that across the different measures of wellbeing, poorer outcomes were seen as the degree of economic inequality increased. Comparing the ratio of the richest 20% of the population to the poorest 20% in terms of annual income, the most unequal countries were Singapore, the United States and Portugal whereas the most equal were Japan and the Scandinavian countries. Among the findings were that greater economic inequality was associated with a greater incidence and severity of health and social problems, including (1) lower life expectancy, (2) greater infant mortality, (3) increased obesity, (4) higher levels of teen pregnancy, (5) lower levels of literacy, mathematical achievement, and overall educational attainment, (6) greater incidence of homicide, (7) increased imprisonment, (8) lower social mobility, (9) increased mental illness, (10) more illegal drug use, (11) lower status of women in society, (12) lower levels of trust among the population, and (13) less willingness to help other countries through foreign aid. These effects impact all members of society and the authors show that they are present across all income brackets. The authors argue that a prime mediator of these outcomes is the increased stress and social anxiety (i.e., evaluation anxiety, reduced self-esteem, feelings of social exclusion) that accompanies inequality as well as an undermining of the compensatory effects of social support and sense of community found in more equal societies.

If reducing inequality would help to alleviate social problems and bring greater welfare to society overall, why is there such resistance to movement in this direction? And why do disadvantaged groups buy into a system that offers them so little while rewarding others?

One explanation comes from social dominance theory (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar & Levin, 2004). It posits that people have an inherent tendency to form and maintain group-based hierarchical social structures in which a privileged group or class in society has power to dominate other subordinate groups. Those with greater power exploit the relatively powerless members of society for social and economic advantage, claiming a greater share of desired goods while directing less desired goods and costs onto the disadvantaged. Institutional discrimination is thereby "one of the major forces creating, maintaining and recreating systems of group-based hierarchy" (pg. 847). According to this view, "race, gender, and class stereotypes are not just cognitive simplifications or negative expectations of other groups... [they] give moral and intellectual legitimacy to the hierarchical relations among these groups" (g. 869).

Based in evolutionary history and the environmental expression of underling genetic predispositions, social dominance is thought to be a characteristic of human beings that underlies the inequality, discrimination, group competition, and violence seen throughout history. Nevertheless, this theory does not offer a completely hopeless expectation for a better society. The authors argue that while there are legitimizing ideologies that arise to justify social dominance and inequality, there are also delegitimizing ideologies that work against hierarchical, and more in favor of egalitarian, social structures. An emphasis with this theoretical orientation is understanding differences in social dominance orientation among individuals and the interaction between forces that facilitate and inhibit the formation and support for group hierarchies.

Like social dominance theory, system justification theory (Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004) explains the perpetuation of social and economic inequality as the result of disadvantaged groups' acceptance of the status quo. Rather than simply complying with the rules of those who hold power in society out of fear of reprisals for social activism or protest, the relatively powerless are seen as actively supporting and buying into the system that places them at a disadvantage.

One possible etiology for this phenomenon is offered by Jost, Pelham, Sheldon and Sullivan (2003). They suggest that the cognitive dissonance resulting from a person's acquiescence and support of a system that puts him or her at a disadvantage would lead to dissonance reduction responses. One such response would be to rationalize this disadvantaged status by providing consonant beliefs that justify the system. Hence, the authors predicted that one might actually observe greatest support of an unequal system among those who are the most disadvantaged by it. The more dissonance aroused, the greater need for justification to eliminate the dissonant state.

In a series studies, using large sample surveys, support was found for this hypothesis (Jost et al. (2003). Those participants with the lowest incomes were found to offer the greatest level of system justification and support. In one study, they were most likely to support laws to limit criticism of the government by the press and limit the rights of citizens to speak out against the government. In a second, they were most likely to believe the government is run for the benefit of all citizens and that government officials can be trusted to do what is right. Other studies found greater support for income inequality among the poorest participants through their endorsement of large pay differences as a means of motivating people to work, and in their belief that anyone can succeed by working hard. Thus, overall the most economically disadvantage were the strongest supporters of the current system. Moreover, these findings often persisted even when controlling for significant effects of race and education on these measures.

Jost, Banaji and Nosek (2004) surveyed a large body of additional research supporting system justification theory. One particularly interesting finding that differentiates the theory from other alternatives (e.g., social identity theory) is that it predicts outgroup favoritism among minority groups. Rather than showing a consistent preference for one's own ingroup, lower-status group members have been found to show more positive attitudes towards higher-status groups to which they do not belong. And although this effect is not always found on explicit measures of group preference, the effect is robust using implicit measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Implicit measures are thought to measure unconscious attitudes and associations in memory that are relatively free of conscious self-presentation, social desirability, or other contextual effects. The finding that higher-status group members show consistent ingroup favoritism whereas lower-status group members do so less consistently, and in some cases actually display a preference for the outgroup instead, supports the theory. Jost et al. also found that favoritism towards higher-status groups among both the ingroup and outgroup was especially pronounced among the more politically conservative.

Another way in which inequality is maintained by those who are dominant in a society is through the creation and application of stereotypes that limit the freedom and opportunities of subordinate group members (Fiske, 1993). If a group is viewed as relatively unintelligent, for example, then it is easier to justify the denial of access to higher education and more rewarding careers. The stereotype serves as a means of rationalizing income differentials and perpetuating status and power differentials. In many cases, a stereotype will not be entirely negative in nature but will contain other compensatory positive attributes that, although more favorable, are not relevant to levels of income or access to other valued resources. These compensatory stereotypes may help foster acceptance by lower-status groups (Kay & Jost, 2003).

With respect to gender stereotyping, Glick and Fiske (2001) view complementary aspects of female stereotypes as reflecting hostile and benevolent forms of sexism, both of which work towards preserving inequality and the status quo, but in a manner that provides justification and greater acceptance by women. Social dominance theorists (Sidanius & Veniegas, 2000) view this form of patriarchal dominance of women by men as distinct from the "arbitrary set" hierarchies that develop along racial, ethnic, or other lines. They argue that discrimination towards the male members of a subordinate group is typically more severe and qualitatively different (e.g., more likely to result in death) than that towards its female members. They also demonstrate that men have stronger social dominance tendencies than women. These differences are thought to be rooted in the biological drive of men to gain reproductive rights over women and eliminate competition by other men.

Although stereotyping may arise as a deliberate and biased means of exerting control over those with less power, they also play a role in basic information processing functions (see Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske & Yzerbyt, 2000). Stereotypes enable a form of heuristic processing that requires little attention and cognitive resources and which may obviate the need for conscious thought. Fiske (1993) has argued that this characteristic of stereotypic thought suggests an asymmetry among individuals with different levels of power in a relationship. Dominant individuals are more likely to stereotype subordinates whereas subordinates are more likely to use individuation strategies in which the unique aspects of the person are recognized. This argument hinges on the assumption that those in power have a minimal need to understand their subordinates at a more personal level. In contrast, their greater dependency in the relationship causes subordinates to strive for a better understanding of those individuals who ultimately control their outcomes. Greater knowledge of those in power potentially enables a greater degree of prediction and control in the relationship despite the power differential. How typical such asymmetries are in modern intergroup settings may be disputed (Overbeck & Park, 2001) , but this argument raises interesting questions about how power asymmetries in relationships may affect stereotyping and information processing.

Social and economic inequality are unlikely to be eliminated entirely and may be an inevitable consequence of human nature. And while inequality appears to foster a wide range of social and health problems, it is also the case that there is significant variation in its manifestation and its extent across societies and regions within a society. As such, efforts to reduce inequality may be effective in fostering better outcomes within society overall.

Arizona Immigration Law

Arizona has adopted a law that may end up being a move back in time towards institutionalized racism. By requiring police to question anyone that is suspected of being in the country illegally the new law is likely to foster abuse and arbitrary harassment by authorities. Will people be suspected of being in the country illegally simply because they appear to be of Hispanic origin? How many legal residents of apparent Hispanic origin will be harassed and assumed to be illegal aliens? How does one eliminate racial profiling when there are few outward indications of one's citizenship and status in the country? And what type of community atmosphere will exist when neighbors start questioning each others' legal status and report them as suspected aliens? How many people will have to be approached on the street and asked by the police to prove that they are in the country legally? If you were stopped would you have your birth certificate on you to prove your citizenship?

Here are a couple of articles from the Huffington Post on this story:

Huffington Post

Will Bunch

Category-Based and Person-Based Processing

Stereotyping represents the application of a social category (e.g., African Americans, Democrats, Jews, women) to someone rather than considering the unique aspects of the individual’s personality, attitudes, beliefs or behavior. A reliance on stereotypes, and adoption of a simplified view of others, may result in perceptual or inferential errors that undermine understanding one’s social environment. A more differentiated view may be achieved through the application of specific subcategories, or subgroups, but even here the person is viewed as a member of a general category rather than as a distinct individual.

It is reasonable to postulate that as we develop a more differentiated view of a person, and come to participate in a greater number and variety of shared experiences, stereotypes would become less useful and less readily applied in new thought or interactions. A more articulated concept would provide advantages due to its better fit to observed behavior and its greater inductive or predictive value. This better understanding could then foster more favorable interactions and might, under certain conditions, even facilitate better intergroup relations through reductions in prejudicial beliefs and attitudes (for example, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000 for discussion of the contact hypothesis).

This process of acquaintanceship and interpersonal learning has been viewed somewhat differently by different authors. Susan Fiske and her colleagues (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske, Lin & Neuberg, 1999) proposed a single continuous process in which a person is first viewed in categorical terms, using a stereotype or social category, but alternatively with a subcategory, exemplar, or in a more piecemeal fashion, paying attention to the individual’s unique characteristics. The perceiver starts with the most general case of the general stereotype and proceeds to more specific representations until a good fit is achieved. If no category is effective in handling incoming information then piecemeal, attribute-based encoding will result. Focusing on the specific attributes of the person, and rejecting categorization based on broad social categories is referred to as individuation. In addition to goodness of fit, the adopted approach will depend on various motivational factors, such as self-relevance (Fisk & Neuberg, 1990), one’s goals (Stangor et al., 1992), contextual demands for accuracy and the degree of outcome dependence between the perceiver and the perceived (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). A key aspect of this theory is that there is a single continuum that accounts for the way we form impressions of other people.

Brewer and Harasty Feinstein (1999) argue instead that processing may take two different paths. On the one hand, the perceiver may initially categorize a target person and engage in category-based processing using a stereotype. When processed in this manner, the representation of the target will be stored in memory as an instance, even if a disconfirming one, of the category and the impression formed of the person will be based on those observed behaviors or inferred traits that are relevant to the category. Even in the case of individuation, the distinguishing information about the perceived individual will still be stored along with the initially invoked social category. On the other hand, person-based processing may occur. In this case, new information is processed without respect to category membership. This results in further differentiation of the person through a process of personalization and in this case information unrelated to the category as well as category-confirming and category-disconfirming information will be incorporated into the impression. Moreover, the representation in this case is independent of broader social categories. Brewer and Harasty Feinstein view category-based processing as a manifestation of intergroup perception whereas person-based processing occurs with interpersonal perception. The latter would be expected to result in a more differentiated, non-stereotypical view of a person.

The processes of individuation and personalization are expected to yield a more distinct representation of the perceived individual and more differentiated view of a group’s members. Although changes to the general stereotype may not result from such disconfirming cases due to subtyping (Brewer & Harasty Feinstein, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Weber & Crocker, 1983) or other processes, the formation of subgroups and individual exemplars in memory provide alternate representational structures for perceiving members of a social group. Moreover, the presentation of personalizing behavioral information has been shown to dominate predictions and inferences to the exclusion of stereotypes when the information is clearly diagnostic, and to weaken the effects of stereotypes in some cases even when the information is not directly diagnostic (see Kunda and Thagard, 1996 for a review).

These latter studies suggest that stereotypes may be applied primarily when little else is known about someone. However, there are challenges to this view. Brewer and Harasty Feinstein (1999) note that despite decades of close interpersonal contact between Serbs and Muslims, civil war and genocide was not prevented from occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another, and perhaps the most conspicuous, counter-example is the phenomenon of self-stereotyping. The fact that people will apply stereotypes to themselves implies that no amount of additional information is likely to eliminate categorization and stereotyping. In the typical case, each individual possesses more detailed information and a more differentiated view of the self than anyone else does. So, using the example of stereotype threat, why is a person unable to muster a wealth of knowledge and many possible exceptions that contradict applicability of the stereotype, especially given findings that the most threatened individuals are those with the most psychological investment, and presumably greatest achievement, in the particular domain (Aronson et al., 1999; Leyens et al., 2000; Pronin, Steele & Ross, 2004)? And why is it that observation of one’s own achievements or counter-stereotypical examples don’t get tagged as exceptions to the stereotype and establish the self as a contradictory subtype of it?

The distinction between category-based and person-based processing provides one path from this quandary. If the stereotype is extremely salient in the setting it may elicit category-based processing of the self rather than person-based processing. The stereotype, once activated and applied to the self, may then inhibit other possible categorizations (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004; Macrae, Bodenhausen & Milne, 1995) and the accessibility of other self-knowledge. Thus, a highly differentiated view of the self, and the presence of personalizing information in the setting, does not prelude the application of category-based processing to oneself. Category-based and person-based approaches appear to represent different modes of processing information that access different representations, or different aspects of a more general representation, in memory.

Muslim Relations: The New Battleground

According to intergroup threat theory, prejudice may emerge when people perceive realistic or symbolic threats to themselves or to a social group with which they identify. Realistic threats are those that threaten one's power, resources, safety, or general well-being. Symbolic threats are those that endanger one's values, religious views, worldview or belief systems, including one's identity and self-esteem (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison, 2009).

Both of these factors are prominently reflected in recent relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Sentiment towards Muslims has become very negative following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 and the subsequent wars aimed at fighting terrorism. Many non-Muslims fear future attacks and feel threatened by perceived Muslim intolerance for other religions, worldviews and lifestyles. Sentiment towards non-Muslims by Muslims also reflects fears of both realistic and symbolic threats to their way of life.

This appears to be the new battleground of prejudice. The following segment was obviously meant to entertain its audience. But this is a serious topic that should be taken quite seriously.

Click Here for Youtube Video

Stereotype Threat

Steele and Aronson (1995) introduced the term stereotype threat to refer to the situation faced when an individual’s behavior is likely to be perceived as conforming to a negative stereotype. They provided the first demonstration of stereotype threat in a study comparing the performance of African American and White college students on a set of verbal problems. Some of the students were told that the test was diagnostic of their verbal abilities whereas others were told that it was not, serving instead to simply provide the researchers with insight into verbal problem solving. A pattern of findings was obtained in which the African American students performed more poorly in the diagnostic condition compared to the white participants more generally and worse than those African Americans assigned to the non-diagnostic condition. When performance on the test was diagnostic and could confirm the stereotype that African Americans are less intelligent than white Americans performance was depressed, suggesting one basis for lower standardized test scores and academic performance among African Americans.

The stereotype threat phenomenon appears to be robust and one obtained in many populations and settings. In Steele and Aronson’s (1995) research, the domain was that of verbal intelligence, but the domain may potentially refer to many different competencies, attributes, or patterns of behavior that are implicated by group stereotypes. The majority of studies have chosen the domain of mathematics and tested stereotype threat in women (Ambady et al., 2004; Ben-Zeev, Fein & Inzlicht, 2005; Brown & Josephs, 1999; Brown & Pinel, 2003; Cadinu, Maass, Frigerio, Impagliazzo & Latinotti, 2003, study 1; Davies et al., 2002; Gresky, Eyck, Lord & McIntyrre, 2005; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; Johns, Schmader & Martens, 2005; Keller & Molix, 2008; Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007a; Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007b; Lesko & Corpus, 2006; Martens et al., 2006, study 1; Marx & Roman, 2002; Marx & Stapel, 2006a; Marx & Stapel, 2006b; Marx & Stapel, 2006c; Marx, Stapel & Muller, 2005; McGlone & Aronson, 2007; McIntyre, Paulson & Lord, 2003; McIntyre et al., 2005; O’Brien & Crandall, 2003; Oswald & Harvey, 2000; Pronin, Steele & Ross, 2004; Rosenthal & Crisp, 2006; Rydell, McConnell & Beilock, 2009; Schmader, 2002; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Schmader, Johns & Barquissau, 2004; Smith & White, 2002, study 1; Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999; Thoman, White, Yamawaki & Koishi, 2008). Mathematics has also been chosen as the domain in studying stereotype threat among Latino men and women (Gonzales et al., 2002), Asian-American women (Shih, Pittinsky & Ambady, 1999), white men (Aronson, Lustina, Good & Keough, 1999; Smith & White, 2002, study 2), and children ranging from elementary to high-school grade levels (Ambady, Shih, Kim & Pittinsky, 2001; Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003; Neuville & Croizet, 2007). Focusing on other skills for which women are thought to be disadvantaged, tests of visual-spatial abilities have also been employed (Martens et al., 2006, study 2; McGlone & Aronson, 2006).

Other studies have focused on educational performance (Aronson et al., 2002) or intellectual abilities in African Americans (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn & Steele, 2001; Cadinu et al., 2003, study 2); Davis, Aronson & Salinas, 2006; Steele & Aronson, 1995 ) or Latinos (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Research has also examined stereotype threat among individuals with biracial identities (Shih, Bonam, Sanchez & Peck, 2007, study 3) and males whose academic or athletic identities were dominant in the setting (Yopyk & Prentice, 2005). However, not all studies have been focused on academic or intellectual performance. There have also been investigations of leadership opportunities (Davies, Spencer & Steele, 2005) and athletic ability (Stone & McWhinnie, 2008) in women, memory ability in older adults (Levy, 1996), childcare interactions of gay men (Bosson, Haymovitz & Pinel, 2004) and emotional sensitivity of men (Leyens, Désert, Croizet & Darcis, 2000; Marx & Stapel, 2006c; Marx & Stapel, 2006d).

The common finding among these studies is that a particular ability, trait, or pattern of behavior expected from a stereotype elicits confirmation of the stereotype from the group’s members.

A common theoretical explanation of this phenomenon has been in terms of Heider’s (1958) balance theory and theories of cognitive consistency (Nosek, Banaji & Greenwald, 2002; Rydel et al., 2009; Schmader, Johns & Forbes, 2008). According to these models, stereotype threat originates in cognitive inconsistency between the relations among three components—the domain, the self, and the stereotyped group. These three relations may be viewed as one’s self-concept with respect to a given domain, one’s social identity with respect to a given social group, and the implications of the group stereotype for performance in the domain. For example, if the domain of mathematics is one valued by a woman, who identifies with her gender, and the stereotype of women suggests poor mathematical ability, there will be a state of inconsistency between wanting to perform well in the domain and the stereotype suggesting that women will do poorly. Recognition by the individual of cognitive inconsistency among these relations results in a revised assessment of the situation or behavior changes (e.g., "the test was biased,") that restore a state of cognitive consistency. This process of recognizing cognitive inconsistency and trying to restore a balanced state is then thought to undermine performance due to interference and competition for cognitive resources in working memory by these inconsistent and arousing thoughts (Schmader & Johns, 2003; Schmader et al, 2008).

Domain identification refers to whether competency in the domain is meaningful and important to the individual's self-concept. It is basically a truism in stereotype threat research that the individual must be identified with the domain to experience stereotype threat. For this reason, studies have often pre-screened participants based on domain importance (Ben-Zeev et al., 2005; Brown & Pinel, 2003; Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; Schmader et al., 2004), domain ability or achievement (Martens et al., 2006; Schmader, 2002; Schmader & Johns, 2003) or both importance and ability (Aronson et al., 1999; Davies et al., 2002; Marx & Roman, 2002; Spencer et al., 1999). A meta-analysis by Walton and Cohen (2003) obtained further support for the importance of domain identification in stereotype threat studies. They found that effects were significantly stronger, and about three times larger in magnitude, for those studies that pre-selected participants who were identified with the domain compared to those that were not. Additionally, a number of studies have obtained evidence for the moderating role of domain identification by examining its effect on stereotype threat directly, and finding threat primarily in individuals highly identified with it (Aronson et al., 1999; Cadinu et al., 2003; Gresky et al., 2005; Lesko & Corpus, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000; Pronin, Steele & Ross, 2004).

The perceived relation between the domain and the self is determined by both the person's identification with the domain and the diagnostic accuracy of an evaluative measure. Major and Schmader (1998) make this distinction in presenting two ways different ways in which the individual may react to negative academic experiences. Both facilitate self esteem and manifest themselves as reactions to stereotype threat. One of these is to devalue the domain, rendering it as unimportant to the self. This response may represent a temporary reaction to the situation, such as within the stereotype threat setting (Davies, Spencer, Quinn & Gerhardstein, 2002, study 3; Rosenthal and Crisp, 2006, study 1), or a more permanent, chronic form of disengagement from the domain. Whereas the former may not have long-term effects, the latter represents a much more destructive form of disengagement that could have life-changing ramifications. Alternatively, one could discount the relevance of feedback by denying that a particular test or experience truly represents an assessment of one’s ability (Lesko & Corpus, 2006). If it is not a valid measure of the ability in question then there is no real threat at hand.

Another aspect of the self thought to moderate stereotype threat is the degree of identification with the stereotyped group. Cognitive consistency theories predict that a higher degree of identification with a negatively stereotyped group should yield greater cognitive inconsistency or imbalance. A number of studies have indeed shown a direct relationship between stereotype threat effects and measures of group identification (Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007b; Schmader, 2002) and stigma consciousness (Brown & Pinel, 2003). However, the use of different measures for these constructs has sometimes failed to validate this relationship or found enhanced performance among more highly identified African Americans (Davis et al., 2006; Mendoza-Denton, Petrzak & Downey, 2008, study 3b).

One important factor to consider with respect to measures of either domain or group identification is the point at which such measures are obtained. Whereas greater identification should enhance stereotype threat effects, changing one’s perceptions of these relationships may serve to restore cognitive consistency and reduce stereotype threat. Thus, some studies have found that stereotype threat resulted in short-term increases in domain (Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa, 2007a) or group (Marx et al., 2005, study 2) identification. For example, Marx et al. found that women rated gender as more important to their identity and as a bigger part of themselves under stereotype threat conditions than a non-diagnostic control. They also had lower expectancies of success on a math test. These findings are not unexpected because heightened salience of a stereotyped group identity is a necessary condition for stereotype threat. By activating this identity the threat is elicited. Moreover, once elicited, the individual is thought to ruminate on the provocative cognitions (Schmader et al., 2008), further activating them in memory. If a restructuring of these cognitions is successful in reducing cognitive inconsistency, however, identification with the domain or group may then be reduced. Opposite relationships may result depending on when identification is assessed (see McFarland, Lev-Arey & Ziegert, 2003).

A demonstration of how highly identified individuals might modify their self identities in response to stereotype threat is provided by Pronin et al. (2004). In the first of several studies, they measured women’s self ratings on gender stereotypic traits and found that the women who had completed more quantitative subjects in school showed a pattern of self perception that they termed identity bifurcation. This phenomenon manifests itself in dissociation from those stereotypic traits that are related negatively to perceived success in the domain. Pronin et al. found not only that those women more highly identified with the domain rated themselves lower on these attributes, but in subsequent studies it was seen that manipulating stereotype threat resulted in situationally induced identity bifurcation. Thus, selectively differentiating oneself from the stereotyped group appears to provide one means of reducing stereotype threat and the cognitive inconsistency thought to underlie it.

Although stereotype threat was originally viewed in terms of how one’s behavior might make the “stereotype more plausible as a self-characterization in the eyes of others, and perhaps even in one's own eyes” (Steele & Aronson, 1995, p. 797, emphasis added), the effect occurs even when one’s behavior remains private (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; Wout, Danso, Jackson and Spencer, 2008). Assessment by others does not appear to be a necessary condition for stereotype threat and it may reflect a relatively private and personal reaction to the setting.

Despite the existence of stereotype threat as a private phenomenon, one can differentiate between threats to the individual and collective selves (Gaertner, Sedikides & Graetz, 1999; Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea & Iuzzini, 2002). Wout, et al. (2008) argued that past research has often confounded these manipulations. They employed different experimental conditions in separating these threats. In a self-threat group, female participants took a math test that assessed their personal mathematical competency. These women graded their own tests and kept scores to themselves, making performance a private matter. A second, group-threat, condition was told the purpose of the test was to assess gender differences in math ability and that no personally identifying information was being collected, only the person’s gender. Thus, performance, although private regarding the self, had implications for a group with whom they identified. Although in the first of multiple studies, evidence of stereotype threat appeared only in the self-threat group, in a subsequent study, Wout el al. found evidence of depressed performance in the group-threat condition as well. However, this effect occurred only among participants who were highly identified with the group. This research suggests that more than one type of process might be operative in test settings and that the two need to be distinguished in future studies. Although self-threat was consistently found to depress performance, group-based threat required a particularly strong collective identity related to the social category.

The experience of stereotype threat is a subjective one and depends on how the individual interprets the situational context. In some cases, different interpretations may be possible. For instance, Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling and Darley (1999) were able to negatively impact the performance of white participants by telling them a golf game was a test of athletic ability whereas African Americans’ performances were impaired by telling them the same game was a test of sports intelligence. In this manner, the ambiguity of the behavioral context allowed for direct manipulation of the domain’s interpretation and its relevance to different racial stereotypes across experimental conditions, each playing to a different racial stereotype.

Other studies have not tried to modify the perceived domain per se, but rather, its perceived relationship to the stereotyped group. For example, Ben-Zeev et al. (2005) told participants in a no-threat condition that a standardized math test was chosen for the study specifically because prior research had found no differences in how men and women performed on the test. Similarly, a number of other studies have reduced threat, and enhanced performance, by describing the same test as culturally unbiased or lacking group differences (Blascovich et al., 2001; Brown & Pinel, 2003; O’Brien & Crandall, 2003; Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999). The assumed causes for such relationships also appear to be important. Thoman et al. (2008) found that attributing gender differences in quantitative test scores to an innate superiority of men reduced women’s performance compared to a condition where differences were attributed to difference in effort.

Once the domain has been assessed, the accessibility and applicability of a given stereotype may be strongly determined. For this reason, stereotype threat may arise even in the absence of specific invocation of the stereotype. Smith and White (2002, study 1), for instance, assessed the extent to which unfavorable stereotypes regarding the mathematical ability of white women (compared to men, study 1) and white men (compared to Asians, study 2) must be explicitly mentioned to invoke stereotype threat. Three groups were used in the study. In one case, no specific stereotype was mentioned and threat was assumed to be elicited implicitly. A second group read a seemingly credible article that argued for differences in mathematical abilities consistent with the stereotype and was told the test they would be taking had shown similar results. In this condition the stereotype was explicitly presented. Finally, a third group was treated the same as the explicit-stereotype condition but was told that the present test had not shown a pattern of differences consistent with the stereotype. This was the nullified-stereotype condition. The basic findings of these studies were that both implicit-stereotype and explicit-stereotype groups displayed poorer test performance than the nullified-stereotype group but comparable performance with respect to each other. In other words, the stereotype did not have to be explicitly mentioned to elicit stereotype threat, because it was, presumably, already accessible in the minds of the participants.

Even stronger evidence for the pervasive salience of stereotypic beliefs within these settings is provided by Walton and Cohen (2003). In their meta-analysis of stereotype lift (a bolstering rather than disruption of performance) and stereotype threat research, they found that effect sizes were much larger in those studies that negated the stereotype rather than simply leaving the domain-group relationship unspecified. This analysis further supports the idea that people may inherently perceive the relevance of applicable stereotypes based on contextual cues and their own membership in the stereotyped group. It also provides more compelling results than those provided by any single study. However, what many of these studies lack is the use of implicit measures of stereotype activation in addition to performance outcome measures. Knowing the strength and content of stereotype activation in these studies would greatly aid in their interpretation.

One reason stereotype threat may result even in the absence of strong contextual cues relating to the stereotype may be that classification in terms of highly salient physical characteristics, such as gender, skin color or age, occurs automatically, independently of one’s conscious goals (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). The composition of individuals within the setting alone can affect the salience of these characteristics (Taylor, 1981). A number of studies have manipulated stereotype threat by placing the participant into a solo or minority status within the larger group (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; Sekaquaptewa, Waldman & Thompson, 2007). Such numerical distinctiveness on the part of the individual appears to heighten awareness as a minority group member and salience of the accompanying stereotype.

A number of different manipulations have been tested by researchers as ways of reducing stereotype threat research. One is the presentation of positive role models or exemplars. Schmader et al. (2008) argue that positive exemplars, or portrayals of stereotype-disconfirming group members, may provide one means of changing the negative relationship between the group and the domain to one that is positive in valence. Studies show that presenting positive exemplars prior to assessment reduces the performance decrements associated with stereotype threat (Marx & Roman, 2002; McIntyre, Paulson & Lord, 2003; McIntyre et al., 2005). However, these effects have not always been exemplars related to the domain under study. In one study, for example, McIntyre et al. (2003, study 2) found that presenting descriptions of successful women in various fields other than mathematics resulted in better math performance than that found among women reading about successful corporations. Because these positive portrayals of successful women were not directly related to the domain in question, they do not appear to be interpretable in terms of modified beliefs regarding the stereotyped group’s competency.

Another strategy for reducing stereotype threat is self-affirmation. Martens et al. (2006, study 1) had participants in a self-affirmation condition rank order 11 characteristics or values that were personally important to them and then write about the highest ranked attribute. In a non-affirmation condition instructions were to choose the item ranked ninth and to write about its importance to other people rather than from their own personal perspective. Women in the affirmation condition showed relief from stereotype threat on a math test compared to those in the non-affirmation condition and compared to male participants.

Gresky et al. (2005) also manipulated the salience of particular aspects of participants' self-concepts. They found that constructing self-concept maps with many nodes by highly math-identified women bolstered test performance compared to those who constructed maps with few nodes or who did not construct self-concept maps. Similarly, Ambady et al. (2004) asked women undergraduates to answer personal questions about themselves, to list positive and negative characteristics of themselves, and to provide examples from their lives for each characteristic listed. The authors viewed this manipulation as fostering individuation and had half of the women perform this task. Additionally, in order to manipulate stereotype threat, the women were either subliminally primed with female word associates or neutral words beforehand. As predicted, the individuation task alleviated the performance impairment among women primed with the female words.

All of these interventions involved manipulations performed prior to the assessment task and presumably prevented the elicitation of stereotype threat. However, is it possible to actively suppress its expression after the fact? Unfortunately, this approach does not appear likely to succeed, at least without considerable effort. Active suppression of unwanted thoughts may further activate the very thoughts that one is attempting to suppress and lead to rebound effects (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Jetten, 1994; Wegner, 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987). Furthermore, the thoughts used to suppress the stereotype’s application may adversely impact the individual’s ability to process other, non-stereotypic information (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1996) and interfere with performance in the stereotype threat setting (Schmader et al., 2008). On the other hand, given repeated training at suppression strategies, it may be possible to achieve some success by eventual conversion of what began as conscious suppression of a stereotype into a relatively effortless automatic activity.

In contrast to the active suppression of interfering thoughts, the operation of inhibitory processes is likely to offer a less effortful, preconscious means of preventing the activation of stereotypes or other threat-inducing cognitions without commandeering working memory resources critical to performance (see Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998 for a discussion of the distinction between category suppression and inhibition). Moskowitz, Gollwitzer and Schaal (1999) found evidence, for example, of the preconscious inhibition of stereotypes by chronic egalitarian goals. It is also possible to inhibit the activation of a stereotype or other category in memory by activating other competing categories (Dunn & Spellman, 2003; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004). For example, Macrae, Bodenhausen and Milne, (1995) had participants view a Chinese woman after subliminal priming of words related to either the female stereotype or others related to her Chinese ancestry. In a subsequent lexical decision task not only were reaction times to words related to the primed stereotype faster than neutral words but those related to the unprimed category were actually slower than the control, thereby demonstrating actual inhibition as well as facilitation of categorical representations in memory.

Through a change in the activation of alternate social identities from one having negative implications for performance in a setting to one having more positive implications, category inhibition may provide a basis for preventing stereotype threat. Indeed, a number of studies show that experimentally manipulated changes in the relative salience of alternate social identities moderate stereotype threat (Ambady et al., 2001; Gresky et al., 2005; McGlone & Aronson, 2006; Neuville & Croizet, 2007; Rydell, McConnell and Beilock, 2009; Shih et al., 1999; Yopyk & Prentice, 2005, study 1) and self-stereotyping (Sinclair, Hardin & Lowery, 2006; Sinclair & Lun, 2006).

One example is provided by Shih et al. (1999). They varied the salience of different stereotypes associated with Asian-American women by either priming the categories of ethnicity or gender. They found that the participants performed the worst on a math test when the gender stereotype was primed, best when the Asian stereotype was primed, and midway between these conditions for a control group. Activation of different stereotypes—one with negative implications for performance and one with positive implications—yielded opposite effects that were consistent with the stereotype. Thus, a shift in identity can reduce stereotype threat if that identity has opposite implications for performance.

This research suggests that interventions aimed at modifying the relative salience of different stereotypes and social identities may provide an effective means of preventing the emergence of stereotype threat. Further research into category inhibition as a basis for interventions in this area are warranted. Moreover, category activation and inhibition may ultimately underlie many of the past interventions proposed for stereotype threat.

For more information about stereotype threat visit ReducingStereotypeThreat.org.

Modern Racism in America

Although racism has characterized humankind throughout history, its content and expression has changed with changing times. Prior to landmark court decisions and the civil rights movement in the second half of the 20th century, overt racist attitudes were not only tolerated but institutionalized in the United States. The Plessy vs. Ferguson decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1896 had declared in its separate but equal doctrine that segregation by race was an acceptable and lawful practice as long as each group was afforded equal facilities. Segregation was entrenched in American society by this decision and by a proliferation of Jim Crow laws that explicitly legislated separate facilities for whites and non-white persons, even in such situations as that of Plessy in which the person's background was multiracial with primarily white ancestry.

It was only after the school desegregation case of Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the National Voting Rights Act of 1965, and other subsequent statutes that institutionalized racist policies were ruled to be illegal. and were no longer viewed as acceptable practice in the nation. In the Brown case it was recognized that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." And in the acts of legislation that followed it was declared that segregation of public accommodations, barriers to voting and equal representation, and discrimination in hiring practices, employment, and housing were unlawful practices punishable under the law.

With changes in the country's laws also came changes in its norms. The direct expression of prejudicial views was no longer tolerated in many regions of the nation, and racism became more implicit, tempered by legally mandated standards of behavior. Irwin Katz and his colleagues (Katz, Wackenhut & Hass, 1986) noted that "the new type of racist avoids expressing opinions that are blatantly antiblack or segregationist, preferring ones that are relatively ambiguous and amenable to being defended on nonracial grounds" (p. 37).

One consequence of the change in societal norms and racial attitudes is that these attitudes have become more complex. In some cases, the individual may only be committed to racial equality in a superficial manner for the purposes of complying to strong social norms and presenting the self in a favorable light. In other cases, there may be sincere feelings of sympathy towards disadvantaged groups in society and a need to appear unprejudiced in his or her own eyes. In either case, interracial interactions are likely to be uncomfortable if accompanied by feeling of intergroup anxiety, salient negative stereotypes about the other's race, or the perception of realistic or symbolic threats among racial groups (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The presence of conflicting attitudes, and less direct expression of negative racial beliefs, feelings or intentions, contrast with the explicit forms of institutionalized racism of America's past.

Sociologists have noted that American society has traditionally supported two different values that may conflict--egalitarianism and individualism. Rokeach (1968) has similarly emphasized the importance of equality and freedom as core values defining national political movements and their leaders. Conflict between these values underlie much of our national political debates. However, most of the views regarding modern forms of racism in this country stress that there is real conflict not just at a societal level but within the individual as well.

Ambivalence

Katz et al. (1986) argue that many white Americans are ambivalent in their interracial attitudes. On the one hand, they are inclined to be sympathetic towards African Americans based on egalitarian values, a recognition of past discrimination, and a belief in social justice. But there is also a strong belief in the Protestant ethic ideals of individual responsibility, hard work, and the personal freedom to choose, and be rewarded for, more virtuous behavior. Higher rates of crime, unemployment, poor academic achievement, and other negative outcomes, to the extent they are viewed as the result of African Americans' own actions, may reinforce negative stereotypes and attitudes toward them. Thus, there exists a duality of values that may underlie the conflicting interracial attitudes of many white Americans.

Weitz

One demonstration of the conflict underlying interracial attitudes was provided in a study by Weitz (1972). She examined both nonverbal (e.g., voice quality and behavioral measures) and verbal measures (trait ratings) of acceptance towards white and black "interaction partners" by male undergraduates. No actual interaction took place but measures were obtained prior to participants' expected meeting with their partners. It was found that both the verbal and nonverbal measures were positively related when participants thought their partners were white; however, when their partners were supposedly black the verbal measures were inversely related to the nonverbal ones. In other words, with a black partner positive expressions of verbal acceptance were paired with negative displays of nonverbal behavior, suggesting conflicted behavior by white participants and the transmission of mixed signals to black partners. This outcome most likely would be uncomfortable for both white and black individuals and discourage further interaction between them.

Donnerstein et al.

The disassociation between direct and indirect expressions of affect have been shown in many other studies. For example, Donnerstein, Donnerstein, Simon and Ditrichs (1972) used a contrived learning paradigm in which participants thought they were helping to condition other participants on a verbal learning task. Their role was to administer shocks to the other person, the "learner," as a means of providing feedback following errors. In actuality, no shocks were actually given. The white participants were told in some cases that the learner was white and in other cases that he was black. There were also manipulations of other factors, including anonymity of the white participant and the opportunity for the learner in the first round to retaliate later when the two individuals switched roles in a second round. One of the primary measures was the amount of direct aggression towards the learner as reflected in the intensity of shocks administered to the learner. In addition, an indirect measure of aggression was obtained by recording the duration of the shocks.

Donnerstein et al. (1972) found that when the participants' identities remained unknown to the learner, or when there was no expectation of later role reversal, they administered more intense shocks to a black learner than a white one. On the other hand, when they were not anonymous, or when they expected potential retaliation, they displayed less direct, but more indirect, aggression towards the black learner. In other words, open and continued interaction with the black learner caused their negative attitudes to be expressed in a disguised manner rather than directly. Again, the picture emerges of prejudicial attitudes being suppressed in one channel of communication but leaking out through another, undoubtedly less closely monitored, one. The Donnersteins have replicated these findings and extended their work in numerous other studies.

Aversive Racism

Other researchers have echoed this idea that prejudice still very much exists in America, but is simply expressed less directly as a response to changing laws and social norms. Gaertner and Dovidio's (1986) theory of aversive racism is one such viewpoint. This "perspective assumes that given the historically racist American culture and human cognitive mechanisms for processing categorical information, racist feelings and beliefs among white Americans are generally the rule rather than the exception" (p. 61). Aversive racists are those that adhere to egalitarian principles, support policies that promote racial equality, and who view themselves as unprejudiced, but who nevertheless harbor negative feelings and beliefs towards African Americans. These researches differentiate their view from that of Katz by not assuming "the widespread existence of genuinely problack, favorable components of whites' racial attitudes that are independent of egalitarian values" (p. 62). Thus, Gaertner and Dovidio's notion of aversive racism appears to offer a less optimistic outlook for the amelioration of existing prejudice.

One key prediction from this theory is that racial discrimination will most evident among aversive racists when there are no salient norms in the setting dictating nondiscriminatory behavior or where there are other salient aspects of the setting that render the person's behavior ambiguous or difficult to interpret. In other words, in those contexts where there are alternative explanations for one's behavior other than prejudicial attitudes and beliefs, overt discrimination is most likely to be expressed. In contrast, where norms of fairness and equal treatment are salient, behaving contrary to these norms is especially suggestive of prejudice and would be expected to confront one's egalitarian self-image.

This prediction also seems to follow from the application of attribution theory. Social norms provide a situational factor that may explain behavior and reduce the inference of dispositional qualities in the actor (Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1971). To the extent that other potential explanations exist for one's behavior, it is possible to avoid attributions of racist attitudes to the self and all of the self-incriminations that they would imply. Moreover, going one step further, it might be argued that through this process of self-perception an individual could anticipate the attribution process in others and gauge whether certain behaviors would be diagnostic of prejudice in the setting. Such diagnostic information could provide a basis for self-presentation strategies on the part of the individual. To what extent people actually in engage in this level of analysis and consciously suppress direct expressions of prejudice, as opposed to having internalized goals that regulate behavior at a preconscious level (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer and Schaal, 1999), remains unclear. It seems reasonable to assume that either process may operate, depending on characteristics of the individual and external factors (e.g., the degree experience in interracial settings).

Frey & Gaertner

Despite these open questions about the internal processes underlying such behavior, Gaertner and Dovidio have obtained strong support for their prediction. For example, in one study (Frey & Gaertner, 1986) white female undergraduates worked on a Scrabble-like task within a group setting in which the opportunity arose for them to help either a white or black coworker. In some cases, the coworker required help due to difficulty of the task (external cause) whereas in other cases this person's own lack of motivation (internal cause) necessitated the need for assistance. Additionally, the request for help came either from the coworker herself or from another person who requested aid on her behalf.

It was expected that when the coworker caused her own difficulties with the task, she would be relatively undeserving of assistance, and there would be an excuse to avoid helping her. However, if the request for aid came from a third-party this would heighten normative beliefs about the appropriateness of helping. Thus, only in the condition where the black coworker asked for help directly, and her difficulty was caused by internal factors, would discriminatory behavior be possible without implying prejudice on the part of the participants. In the other cases, there would be a more obvious violation of normative demands that would signal racist attitudes.

The results strongly supported this reasoning. On a number of different measures, offers to help and the quality of help offered were all lower for the black coworker who was responsible for her own need of assistance and directly asked for help. In all other conditions treatment was equivalent for black and white recipients. Moreover, the factors that justified not helping the black coworker did not appear to significantly undermine the offering of assistance to a white coworker, suggesting that these conditions facilitated the expression of racist attitudes rather than simply causing reduced help to all persons in need.

Conclusion

This research portrays prejudice in a different light than that which operated in the institutionalized racist culture of the United States prior to the civil rights movement and legislation of the 20th century. With the prevalence of egalitarian values, and new laws prohibiting discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, or other social categories, persistent prejudicial attitudes and stereotypes can no longer be expressed directly. Instead, they appear to find expression through channels and in contexts which render such behavior less detectable or more ambiguous in its meaning.