German Prejudice from the Top

Anti-Muslim prejudice coming from Germany's leader. See here.

NYC Mosque

It's hard not to see the religious intolerance underlying the New York city mosque issue. One good commentary is given by Keith Olbermann:

Keith Olbermann video

Recently, Newt Gingrich stated that we would not allow Nazi's to build a center next to an WWII German concentration camp or for the Japanese to build next to Pearl Harbor. Does anybody see the difference here in this ridiculous analogy. We were at war with Nazi Germany, fighting against a brutal, racist, expansionist nation. Japan, too, was a country that attacked the United States after undertaking similar expansionist policies in Asia. We were NOT attacked by a country named Islam in NYC. And equating Muslims more generally to the radical extremists who brought down the twin towers is nothing short of prejudice and religious intolerance.

Even if all terrorists were Muslim (anybody remember Timothy McVeigh?) this does not mean that all Muslims are terrorists. And this is precisely what is happening in NYC with the protests. They are saying Muslims should not build a community center there in respect for the family's of the 9/11 victims and their families. But the Muslim community is not responsible for the deaths, a handful of Muslim terrorists are. People are unfortunately, equating the two groups.

People are also criticizing Obama for getting involved in what some think of as a "local issue." But I see this matter very differently. As an African American, President Obama understands the racist heritage of this country and it is his moral right and obligation as its leader to speak out against the rising wave of religious hatred engulfing this country. It is his sworn duty to protect the constitution of the United States and affirming the right of any religious group to build a center or mosque on private property cannot be taken away without making exceptions to the rights of our citizens, as protected by the Bill of Rights. Personally, I respect a leader who does the right thing and defends our liberties rather than letting the wave of intolerance rule. Majority rules only within the limits of the laws of this land that defend the rights of minorities from persecution by a prejudiced majority.

For more information on the proposed NYC Muslim center see this

New York Times article.

I personally find it very interesting that one of the leaders of this center consulted with a rabbi of a nearby Jewish Community Center for ideas of how to design it.

Entitativity and Group Perception

Prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination refer to attitudes, beliefs and behavior towards other people based on their association with a particular social group. In studying these aspects of social behavior, the focus is most commonly on race, ethnicity, religion or gender. This is not surprising given their prominence in historical conflicts and social movements. They also are core aspects of social identity for most people. Yet social groups of this type only represent some of the many groups in which we participate, to which we belong, or with which we identify. There are many types of groups in our social environment. But what exactly is meant by a social group and what determines whether we view a set of individuals as constituting a group or simply a mass of distinct individuals?

Lickel et al. (2000) approached these questions through a set of studies in the United States and Poland. Participants were asked to rate 40 different types of groups using descriptions such as "members of a family," "members of a professional sports team," "Women," "students at a university," and "people in line at the bank." Each collection of people was rated on a variety of measures, including: (1) importance of the group to its members; (2) the amount of interaction among it members; (3) whether members of the group shared common goals; (4) whether they shared common outcomes; (5) the similarity among group members; (6) its typical duration; (7) the degree to which members can enter or leave the group voluntarily, that is, permeability; and (8) group size. Also assessed was the extent to which the group description was viewed as actually qualifying as a group. Ratings were obtained on a continuous nine-point scale ranging from "not a group at all" to "very much a group." It was thought that this measure would quantify perceptions of a group's entitativity--a concept first introduced by Donald Campbell (1958)--which Lickel et al. define as the "degree to which a collection of persons are perceived as being bonded together into a coherent unit" (pg. 224).

A number of different analyses were conducted. One focus was on which of the measures best predicted the degree of entitativity of the groups. The strongest predictor was found to be the degree of interaction among group members, but group importance, common goals, common outcomes, and member similarity were also directly related to entitativity ratings. In contrast, increased group size and permeability of group boundaries were more modestly, and inversely, related to entitativity. These findings suggest that aggregates of people are more likely to be viewed as a group as they become more coordinated and focused on common goals and outcomes. These attributes often characterize groups with explicit rules or prevalent implicit norms and with specific roles for coordinating the actions of its members. Hierarchies with status and power differentials also tend to characterize highly entitative groups. Hamilton, Sherman and Lickel (1998) argue that such organization and structure is a key factor contributing to the perception of a group as being a unified, coherent, and behaviorally consistent entity.

Under conditions of high entitativity it becomes more common to speak of the group as an entity in and of itself. We might, for example, refer to a workgroup as having objectives or a reputation. A sports team has a record of wins and losses shared by all members of the team, and it may be viewed collectively as being relatively competent or incompetent. There may be good and bad athletes on the team but the team has a record that all share regardless of its members' individual abilities. Similarly, a corporation may be said to have a particular culture and display certain traits, such as being socially conscious, collegial, or even playful in nature. Thus, one can conceptualize the collective entity as having inherent properties, even though these may be different than the individual characteristics of particular group members. It has been proposed that as groups appear more entitative in nature, processing and storage of information by perceivers will come to mimic what occurs when impressions are formed of individual persons rather than showing the differences normally found in individual and group studies of impression formation (see Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).

Lickel et al. (200) also asked participants to sort the presented group descriptions into piles of distinct types based on their perceived similarity to each other. Although there were slight differences across analyses, there was much agreement, despite the use of different techniques. There was also a very high degree of consistency across the different studies and subject populations. The final study of the series, and later presentation by Hamilton and his colleagues (Hamilton, Sherman, Crump & Spencer-Rodgers, 2009), endorsed a solution with four basic types of groups. These were labeled (1) intimacy groups, (2) task groups, (3) social categories, and (4) loose associations.

The first of these types included such groups as family members and friends. These were seen as small groups having high degrees of interaction, of long duration, high importance and impermeable boundaries. Task groups included committees and work groups. They were also viewed as small groups with shared goals, but having a shorter life span and more permeable boundaries than intimacy groups. Social categories are what we normally think of when talking about prejudice, such as racial, ethnic or religious groups. They are large in size but with relatively little interaction among members in the broader sense and which are long lasting and impermeable. Finally, loose associations included cases where there was only a minimal bond among people, such as people sharing a common interest, or little shared other than proximity or other superficial similarity. Examples of the latter would be people queuing up at a bank or bus stop. Entitativity was rated most highly for intimacy groups, followed by task groups, social categories, and finally loose associations.

There are some groups that do not fit so obviously into one of these four types. For example, political parties are often viewed as social categories rather than task groups but they possess elements of both. They are large in size like many social categories. But they have less rigid borders and people are free to enter or leave the party at will. They are generally long lasting but not compared to ethnic, racial or religious groups. Some parties have arose only for a limited number of political campaigns and died out shortly thereafter--a quality more typical of task groups. Like task groups political parties have an organizational structure, shared objectives, and common outcomes in terms of their success in elections. However, high levels of interaction occur primarily among a subset of the party's members and the activity level is seasonal, varying as a function of particular campaign cycles.

Closely related to these groups are "conservatives" and "liberals." These groups are very similar in many ways to political parties in that they favor particular political and ideological positions. Like party members, those falling within these groups may be active or detached with respect to the political process and may enter or leave the category at will, at least in their own minds. There is no formal declaration by an individual as to membership in these groups and no formal organizational structure in this sense. As such they appear to be even more removed from the task group category than political parties. Yet all of these politically oriented groups seem to straddle the boundary between task groups and social categories. Are they large task groups or social categories with permeable boundaries and relatively shorter durations?

It is interesting to note that in a study thought to scale social categories along a dimension of entitativity, "Republicans" and "liberals" were among the groups scoring highest on this metric (Haslam, Rothschild & Ernst, 2000). Unfortunately, due to the emphasis on social categories rather than all types of groups, the range of entitativity across those groups sampled in this research was severely limited. Many of those factors which promote perceptions of entitativity are not generally associated with social categories. Members of social categories exhibit relatively low levels of interaction among themselves. There is little coordination and organization within the group. To some degree, those comprising a social category may share a common fate as a result of discrimination or common historical treatment within a society. They may also share norms or experiences as a result of a common cultural heritage. However, social categories represent very large aggregates where interaction and common outcomes, in a more proximal sense, is unlikely between any two arbitrarily chosen members. This may be one reason why social categories are typically viewed as only moderate in entitativity.

Rothbart and Taylor (1999) argue that perceivers act as though social categories reflect natural kinds rather than socially constructed classifications. Such categories are thought to have inductive potential in the sense that once a person is classified as an exemplar of the category, it is possible to infer other characteristics thought to be common to its members. There is an assumed similarity or homogeneity among a group's members which derives from an underlying essence within each of its members. Once classified as an instance of the category based on readily apparent surface attributes, the perceiver will come to infer other less apparent, more distal, and possibly more abstract attributes. For example, observing such surface attributes as body shape, hair style, clothing, or others that might distinguish between men and women, other underlying attributes, such as nurturance or aggressiveness, may be inferred. Such is the basis for stereotyping and overgeneralization in social perception. An initial categorization of someone as belonging to a category results in the activation of many other associated beliefs.

Rothbart and Taylor also posit that social categories are construed by perceivers as unalterable, with impermeable borders, and whose membership is not freely chosen by members. It is thought that one cannot readily shed one's race or ethnicity, for example. Of course, such beliefs may not be based in fact but still be psychologically meaningful. What is the race of someone who is a mixture of European and African lineage? Is there a single essence or a combination of different essences, and if the latter, does the concept any longer serve a useful function? Such cases of mixed identities argue against the essentialist position and point to the social origin of such categories.

Another example is presented by Rothbart and Taylor in their discussion of how Jews have been treated throughout history. They note that Jews were once viewed as a group of people who had simply not chosen to believe in Christianity and that those who converted were treated the same as other Christians. Later, during the Spanish Inquisition, converted Jews were treated as a separate, and persecuted, subgroup of Christians. Still later, within Nazi Germany, Jews were considered a separate race entirely, defined by parental lineage. Thus, different considerations challenge the assumptions underlying essentialist belief systems. Rothbart and Taylor argue not for this untenable philosophical position but for the notion that people adopt this perspective in their perceptions and thinking about other people.

The tendency to view social categories as natural kinds with inherent characteristics shared among members may explain why stereotyping is so commonplace towards these groups despite the modest entitativity associated with social categories more generally. Hamilton et al. (2009) offer another explanation. They suggest that perceived entitativity may combine with strong contrast effects among opposing social categories (i.e., a large metacontrast ratio or high levels of intragroup similarity combined with large intergroup differences) and thereby foster stereotyping towards only moderately entitative groups. Yet another reason perhaps is the greater number of attributes and the richness of descriptions associated with social categories compared to task groups (Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton & Sherman, 2007, study 1), although this may be the outcome of stereotyping rather than a basis of its origin.

Hamilton et al. (2009) argue that with increasing entitativity the group emerges as a unified entity and its members become largely interchangeable elements within it. The authors summarize findings showing that there is greater difficulty distinguishing between the members of more highly entitative groups. In one series of studies (Crawford, Sherman & Hamilton, 2002), for example, it was found that traits spontaneously inferred from the behaviors of one group member were later attributed erroneously to other members of the same group and that these errors were most evident when entitativity was high rather than low. These findings suggest that members of the highly unified groups came to be seen as equivalent and undifferentiated. As a result of such intragroup confusion, perceptions of homogeneity within the group and stereotyping towards it may be promoted.

Spencer-Rodgers et al. (2007) view entitativity or the property of "groupness" as an essential aspect of group perception and a necessary condition for stereotyping. In their words, "a collection of individuals must be perceived as having a core nature or a set of common features that connect and bind the members together before stereotypic attributes can be ascribed to the group as a whole.. one must view a group as a meaningful social unit before one can hold a stereotype about the group" (pg. 386). In their research (study 2) they demonstrate that entitativity mediates stereotypic judgments for both task groups and social categories.

But is there is single dimension of entitativity that applies to all types of groups and which has common perceptual cues in all instances? Brewer, Hond and Li (2004) suggest that there are two different implicit theories of group entitativity with each having different cues and units of analysis. One meaning of entitativity is based on a theory of essence in which the perceiver attends to cues of intragroup similarity or homogeneity of personality. Other cues to entitativity include the degree of behavioral consistency across individuals and across time for the group overall. There is a search for clear boundaries that enable the group to be distinguished from others. This corresponds to the type of group coherence described by Rothbart and Taylor (1999).

The other meaning of entitativity is based on a theory of agency in which common goals define the group. The focus of attention in this case is on heterogeneity among different members within the group (e.g., different roles) and dynamic changes signifying group development and goal attainment. With respect to intergroup behavior there is an attempt to understand the group's relationship to other groups and the group's place within the larger encompassing social structure. This distinction between two versions of the entitativity concept will hopefully clarify what has been a rather confusing area of research.

Brewer et al. (2004) place some important limiting conditions on perceptions of these two forms of entitativity: "Attribute similarity alone does not correspond to high entitativity, unless the attributes have been essentialized. Similarity of goals and purposes alone does not correspond to high entitativity, unless the group is perceived as acting in concert on their common goals" (pg. 29). One question that arises in light of these two different conceptions of entitativity is how the two types combine in the process of group perception. What happens when both are heightened as could occur when members of a social category appear to become mobilized to action or social protest? Examples would include recent demonstrations by Latinos over the Arizona immigration law or African Americans' protests and boycotts during the civil rights marches of the 1960s. Do these events give rise to a new distinct subgroup within the larger social category, or do such actions generalize to the larger collective from which it has emerged? Under what conditions might the actions of a group of activists be associated with one particular social group despite a mixture of support from other groups as well? Another issue is whether any changes occur to group stereotypes in terms of their content and strength during and following such dynamic changes in activity and coordination among the members of a social category. Social change involves dynamic changes in group cohesiveness, unity, and the crystallization of shared goals. Consequently, changes in perceived group entitativity would be expected to accompany such changes along with changes in group identification and stereotyping among by members of both ingroups and outgroups.

Social and Economic Inequality

Although many factors may cause social and economic inequality in a society, one of notable importance is the discrimination faced by minority groups. This is seen in income disparities across racial, ethnic and gender group boundaries. According to United States census data (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0685.pdf), the median income of white males in 2007 was $35,141 compared to $25,822 and $24,451 for African American and Hispanic males, respectively. This differential is even greater than that for females because of large pay differentials between men and women that reduce ethnic disparities. Comparable figures for women were $21,069, $19,752, and $16,748, respectively. Moreover, these differences are not due to different levels of educational attainment. Pay differentials exist across all educational levels.

Differences in income are also reflected in the number of people living under poverty thresholds (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0695.pdf). In 2007, 10.5% of whites lived in poverty compared to 24.5% of African Americans and 21.5% of Hispanics. Household wealth reflects similar differences. Median net worth of whites in 2007 was $170,400 compared to $27,800 for non-whites and Hispanics (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0705.pdf).

It would be reasonable to expect that such disparities primarily harm those at the low end of the economic ladder, and indeed the poor show disadvantages not only economically but along a host of other measures of social inequality and general wellbeing. But according to Wilkinson and Pickett (2009), as conveyed in their book The Spirit Level, income inequality does not only affect the poor; it adversely affects people at all levels of income within a society. They gathered data from a large array of government, non-government organizational, and scientific sources in studying the relationship of income inequality to a variety of measures of wellbeing within democratic, modern industrialized countries, including more than a dozen European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Singapore, Australia, new Zealand and Israel. Additionally, they looked at these relationships across the fifty states in the U.S.

Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) showed that across the different measures of wellbeing, poorer outcomes were seen as the degree of economic inequality increased. Comparing the ratio of the richest 20% of the population to the poorest 20% in terms of annual income, the most unequal countries were Singapore, the United States and Portugal whereas the most equal were Japan and the Scandinavian countries. Among the findings were that greater economic inequality was associated with a greater incidence and severity of health and social problems, including (1) lower life expectancy, (2) greater infant mortality, (3) increased obesity, (4) higher levels of teen pregnancy, (5) lower levels of literacy, mathematical achievement, and overall educational attainment, (6) greater incidence of homicide, (7) increased imprisonment, (8) lower social mobility, (9) increased mental illness, (10) more illegal drug use, (11) lower status of women in society, (12) lower levels of trust among the population, and (13) less willingness to help other countries through foreign aid. These effects impact all members of society and the authors show that they are present across all income brackets. The authors argue that a prime mediator of these outcomes is the increased stress and social anxiety (i.e., evaluation anxiety, reduced self-esteem, feelings of social exclusion) that accompanies inequality as well as an undermining of the compensatory effects of social support and sense of community found in more equal societies.

If reducing inequality would help to alleviate social problems and bring greater welfare to society overall, why is there such resistance to movement in this direction? And why do disadvantaged groups buy into a system that offers them so little while rewarding others?

One explanation comes from social dominance theory (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar & Levin, 2004). It posits that people have an inherent tendency to form and maintain group-based hierarchical social structures in which a privileged group or class in society has power to dominate other subordinate groups. Those with greater power exploit the relatively powerless members of society for social and economic advantage, claiming a greater share of desired goods while directing less desired goods and costs onto the disadvantaged. Institutional discrimination is thereby "one of the major forces creating, maintaining and recreating systems of group-based hierarchy" (pg. 847). According to this view, "race, gender, and class stereotypes are not just cognitive simplifications or negative expectations of other groups... [they] give moral and intellectual legitimacy to the hierarchical relations among these groups" (g. 869).

Based in evolutionary history and the environmental expression of underling genetic predispositions, social dominance is thought to be a characteristic of human beings that underlies the inequality, discrimination, group competition, and violence seen throughout history. Nevertheless, this theory does not offer a completely hopeless expectation for a better society. The authors argue that while there are legitimizing ideologies that arise to justify social dominance and inequality, there are also delegitimizing ideologies that work against hierarchical, and more in favor of egalitarian, social structures. An emphasis with this theoretical orientation is understanding differences in social dominance orientation among individuals and the interaction between forces that facilitate and inhibit the formation and support for group hierarchies.

Like social dominance theory, system justification theory (Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004) explains the perpetuation of social and economic inequality as the result of disadvantaged groups' acceptance of the status quo. Rather than simply complying with the rules of those who hold power in society out of fear of reprisals for social activism or protest, the relatively powerless are seen as actively supporting and buying into the system that places them at a disadvantage.

One possible etiology for this phenomenon is offered by Jost, Pelham, Sheldon and Sullivan (2003). They suggest that the cognitive dissonance resulting from a person's acquiescence and support of a system that puts him or her at a disadvantage would lead to dissonance reduction responses. One such response would be to rationalize this disadvantaged status by providing consonant beliefs that justify the system. Hence, the authors predicted that one might actually observe greatest support of an unequal system among those who are the most disadvantaged by it. The more dissonance aroused, the greater need for justification to eliminate the dissonant state.

In a series studies, using large sample surveys, support was found for this hypothesis (Jost et al. (2003). Those participants with the lowest incomes were found to offer the greatest level of system justification and support. In one study, they were most likely to support laws to limit criticism of the government by the press and limit the rights of citizens to speak out against the government. In a second, they were most likely to believe the government is run for the benefit of all citizens and that government officials can be trusted to do what is right. Other studies found greater support for income inequality among the poorest participants through their endorsement of large pay differences as a means of motivating people to work, and in their belief that anyone can succeed by working hard. Thus, overall the most economically disadvantage were the strongest supporters of the current system. Moreover, these findings often persisted even when controlling for significant effects of race and education on these measures.

Jost, Banaji and Nosek (2004) surveyed a large body of additional research supporting system justification theory. One particularly interesting finding that differentiates the theory from other alternatives (e.g., social identity theory) is that it predicts outgroup favoritism among minority groups. Rather than showing a consistent preference for one's own ingroup, lower-status group members have been found to show more positive attitudes towards higher-status groups to which they do not belong. And although this effect is not always found on explicit measures of group preference, the effect is robust using implicit measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). Implicit measures are thought to measure unconscious attitudes and associations in memory that are relatively free of conscious self-presentation, social desirability, or other contextual effects. The finding that higher-status group members show consistent ingroup favoritism whereas lower-status group members do so less consistently, and in some cases actually display a preference for the outgroup instead, supports the theory. Jost et al. also found that favoritism towards higher-status groups among both the ingroup and outgroup was especially pronounced among the more politically conservative.

Another way in which inequality is maintained by those who are dominant in a society is through the creation and application of stereotypes that limit the freedom and opportunities of subordinate group members (Fiske, 1993). If a group is viewed as relatively unintelligent, for example, then it is easier to justify the denial of access to higher education and more rewarding careers. The stereotype serves as a means of rationalizing income differentials and perpetuating status and power differentials. In many cases, a stereotype will not be entirely negative in nature but will contain other compensatory positive attributes that, although more favorable, are not relevant to levels of income or access to other valued resources. These compensatory stereotypes may help foster acceptance by lower-status groups (Kay & Jost, 2003).

With respect to gender stereotyping, Glick and Fiske (2001) view complementary aspects of female stereotypes as reflecting hostile and benevolent forms of sexism, both of which work towards preserving inequality and the status quo, but in a manner that provides justification and greater acceptance by women. Social dominance theorists (Sidanius & Veniegas, 2000) view this form of patriarchal dominance of women by men as distinct from the "arbitrary set" hierarchies that develop along racial, ethnic, or other lines. They argue that discrimination towards the male members of a subordinate group is typically more severe and qualitatively different (e.g., more likely to result in death) than that towards its female members. They also demonstrate that men have stronger social dominance tendencies than women. These differences are thought to be rooted in the biological drive of men to gain reproductive rights over women and eliminate competition by other men.

Although stereotyping may arise as a deliberate and biased means of exerting control over those with less power, they also play a role in basic information processing functions (see Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske & Yzerbyt, 2000). Stereotypes enable a form of heuristic processing that requires little attention and cognitive resources and which may obviate the need for conscious thought. Fiske (1993) has argued that this characteristic of stereotypic thought suggests an asymmetry among individuals with different levels of power in a relationship. Dominant individuals are more likely to stereotype subordinates whereas subordinates are more likely to use individuation strategies in which the unique aspects of the person are recognized. This argument hinges on the assumption that those in power have a minimal need to understand their subordinates at a more personal level. In contrast, their greater dependency in the relationship causes subordinates to strive for a better understanding of those individuals who ultimately control their outcomes. Greater knowledge of those in power potentially enables a greater degree of prediction and control in the relationship despite the power differential. How typical such asymmetries are in modern intergroup settings may be disputed (Overbeck & Park, 2001) , but this argument raises interesting questions about how power asymmetries in relationships may affect stereotyping and information processing.

Social and economic inequality are unlikely to be eliminated entirely and may be an inevitable consequence of human nature. And while inequality appears to foster a wide range of social and health problems, it is also the case that there is significant variation in its manifestation and its extent across societies and regions within a society. As such, efforts to reduce inequality may be effective in fostering better outcomes within society overall.

Arizona Immigration Law

Arizona has adopted a law that may end up being a move back in time towards institutionalized racism. By requiring police to question anyone that is suspected of being in the country illegally the new law is likely to foster abuse and arbitrary harassment by authorities. Will people be suspected of being in the country illegally simply because they appear to be of Hispanic origin? How many legal residents of apparent Hispanic origin will be harassed and assumed to be illegal aliens? How does one eliminate racial profiling when there are few outward indications of one's citizenship and status in the country? And what type of community atmosphere will exist when neighbors start questioning each others' legal status and report them as suspected aliens? How many people will have to be approached on the street and asked by the police to prove that they are in the country legally? If you were stopped would you have your birth certificate on you to prove your citizenship?

Here are a couple of articles from the Huffington Post on this story:

Huffington Post

Will Bunch

Category-Based and Person-Based Processing

Stereotyping represents the application of a social category (e.g., African Americans, Democrats, Jews, women) to someone rather than considering the unique aspects of the individual’s personality, attitudes, beliefs or behavior. A reliance on stereotypes, and adoption of a simplified view of others, may result in perceptual or inferential errors that undermine understanding one’s social environment. A more differentiated view may be achieved through the application of specific subcategories, or subgroups, but even here the person is viewed as a member of a general category rather than as a distinct individual.

It is reasonable to postulate that as we develop a more differentiated view of a person, and come to participate in a greater number and variety of shared experiences, stereotypes would become less useful and less readily applied in new thought or interactions. A more articulated concept would provide advantages due to its better fit to observed behavior and its greater inductive or predictive value. This better understanding could then foster more favorable interactions and might, under certain conditions, even facilitate better intergroup relations through reductions in prejudicial beliefs and attitudes (for example, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000 for discussion of the contact hypothesis).

This process of acquaintanceship and interpersonal learning has been viewed somewhat differently by different authors. Susan Fiske and her colleagues (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske, Lin & Neuberg, 1999) proposed a single continuous process in which a person is first viewed in categorical terms, using a stereotype or social category, but alternatively with a subcategory, exemplar, or in a more piecemeal fashion, paying attention to the individual’s unique characteristics. The perceiver starts with the most general case of the general stereotype and proceeds to more specific representations until a good fit is achieved. If no category is effective in handling incoming information then piecemeal, attribute-based encoding will result. Focusing on the specific attributes of the person, and rejecting categorization based on broad social categories is referred to as individuation. In addition to goodness of fit, the adopted approach will depend on various motivational factors, such as self-relevance (Fisk & Neuberg, 1990), one’s goals (Stangor et al., 1992), contextual demands for accuracy and the degree of outcome dependence between the perceiver and the perceived (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). A key aspect of this theory is that there is a single continuum that accounts for the way we form impressions of other people.

Brewer and Harasty Feinstein (1999) argue instead that processing may take two different paths. On the one hand, the perceiver may initially categorize a target person and engage in category-based processing using a stereotype. When processed in this manner, the representation of the target will be stored in memory as an instance, even if a disconfirming one, of the category and the impression formed of the person will be based on those observed behaviors or inferred traits that are relevant to the category. Even in the case of individuation, the distinguishing information about the perceived individual will still be stored along with the initially invoked social category. On the other hand, person-based processing may occur. In this case, new information is processed without respect to category membership. This results in further differentiation of the person through a process of personalization and in this case information unrelated to the category as well as category-confirming and category-disconfirming information will be incorporated into the impression. Moreover, the representation in this case is independent of broader social categories. Brewer and Harasty Feinstein view category-based processing as a manifestation of intergroup perception whereas person-based processing occurs with interpersonal perception. The latter would be expected to result in a more differentiated, non-stereotypical view of a person.

The processes of individuation and personalization are expected to yield a more distinct representation of the perceived individual and more differentiated view of a group’s members. Although changes to the general stereotype may not result from such disconfirming cases due to subtyping (Brewer & Harasty Feinstein, 1999; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Weber & Crocker, 1983) or other processes, the formation of subgroups and individual exemplars in memory provide alternate representational structures for perceiving members of a social group. Moreover, the presentation of personalizing behavioral information has been shown to dominate predictions and inferences to the exclusion of stereotypes when the information is clearly diagnostic, and to weaken the effects of stereotypes in some cases even when the information is not directly diagnostic (see Kunda and Thagard, 1996 for a review).

These latter studies suggest that stereotypes may be applied primarily when little else is known about someone. However, there are challenges to this view. Brewer and Harasty Feinstein (1999) note that despite decades of close interpersonal contact between Serbs and Muslims, civil war and genocide was not prevented from occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another, and perhaps the most conspicuous, counter-example is the phenomenon of self-stereotyping. The fact that people will apply stereotypes to themselves implies that no amount of additional information is likely to eliminate categorization and stereotyping. In the typical case, each individual possesses more detailed information and a more differentiated view of the self than anyone else does. So, using the example of stereotype threat, why is a person unable to muster a wealth of knowledge and many possible exceptions that contradict applicability of the stereotype, especially given findings that the most threatened individuals are those with the most psychological investment, and presumably greatest achievement, in the particular domain (Aronson et al., 1999; Leyens et al., 2000; Pronin, Steele & Ross, 2004)? And why is it that observation of one’s own achievements or counter-stereotypical examples don’t get tagged as exceptions to the stereotype and establish the self as a contradictory subtype of it?

The distinction between category-based and person-based processing provides one path from this quandary. If the stereotype is extremely salient in the setting it may elicit category-based processing of the self rather than person-based processing. The stereotype, once activated and applied to the self, may then inhibit other possible categorizations (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004; Macrae, Bodenhausen & Milne, 1995) and the accessibility of other self-knowledge. Thus, a highly differentiated view of the self, and the presence of personalizing information in the setting, does not prelude the application of category-based processing to oneself. Category-based and person-based approaches appear to represent different modes of processing information that access different representations, or different aspects of a more general representation, in memory.

Muslim Relations: The New Battleground

According to intergroup threat theory, prejudice may emerge when people perceive realistic or symbolic threats to themselves or to a social group with which they identify. Realistic threats are those that threaten one's power, resources, safety, or general well-being. Symbolic threats are those that endanger one's values, religious views, worldview or belief systems, including one's identity and self-esteem (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison, 2009).

Both of these factors are prominently reflected in recent relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Sentiment towards Muslims has become very negative following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 and the subsequent wars aimed at fighting terrorism. Many non-Muslims fear future attacks and feel threatened by perceived Muslim intolerance for other religions, worldviews and lifestyles. Sentiment towards non-Muslims by Muslims also reflects fears of both realistic and symbolic threats to their way of life.

This appears to be the new battleground of prejudice. The following segment was obviously meant to entertain its audience. But this is a serious topic that should be taken quite seriously.

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Stereotype Threat

Steele and Aronson (1995) introduced the term stereotype threat to refer to the situation faced when an individual’s behavior is likely to be perceived as conforming to a negative stereotype. They provided the first demonstration of stereotype threat in a study comparing the performance of African American and White college students on a set of verbal problems. Some of the students were told that the test was diagnostic of their verbal abilities whereas others were told that it was not, serving instead to simply provide the researchers with insight into verbal problem solving. A pattern of findings was obtained in which the African American students performed more poorly in the diagnostic condition compared to the white participants more generally and worse than those African Americans assigned to the non-diagnostic condition. When performance on the test was diagnostic and could confirm the stereotype that African Americans are less intelligent than white Americans performance was depressed, suggesting one basis for lower standardized test scores and academic performance among African Americans.

The stereotype threat phenomenon appears to be robust and one obtained in many populations and settings. In Steele and Aronson’s (1995) research, the domain was that of verbal intelligence, but the domain may potentially refer to many different competencies, attributes, or patterns of behavior that are implicated by group stereotypes. The majority of studies have chosen the domain of mathematics and tested stereotype threat in women (Ambady et al., 2004; Ben-Zeev, Fein & Inzlicht, 2005; Brown & Josephs, 1999; Brown & Pinel, 2003; Cadinu, Maass, Frigerio, Impagliazzo & Latinotti, 2003, study 1; Davies et al., 2002; Gresky, Eyck, Lord & McIntyrre, 2005; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; Johns, Schmader & Martens, 2005; Keller & Molix, 2008; Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007a; Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007b; Lesko & Corpus, 2006; Martens et al., 2006, study 1; Marx & Roman, 2002; Marx & Stapel, 2006a; Marx & Stapel, 2006b; Marx & Stapel, 2006c; Marx, Stapel & Muller, 2005; McGlone & Aronson, 2007; McIntyre, Paulson & Lord, 2003; McIntyre et al., 2005; O’Brien & Crandall, 2003; Oswald & Harvey, 2000; Pronin, Steele & Ross, 2004; Rosenthal & Crisp, 2006; Rydell, McConnell & Beilock, 2009; Schmader, 2002; Schmader & Johns, 2003; Schmader, Johns & Barquissau, 2004; Smith & White, 2002, study 1; Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999; Thoman, White, Yamawaki & Koishi, 2008). Mathematics has also been chosen as the domain in studying stereotype threat among Latino men and women (Gonzales et al., 2002), Asian-American women (Shih, Pittinsky & Ambady, 1999), white men (Aronson, Lustina, Good & Keough, 1999; Smith & White, 2002, study 2), and children ranging from elementary to high-school grade levels (Ambady, Shih, Kim & Pittinsky, 2001; Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003; Neuville & Croizet, 2007). Focusing on other skills for which women are thought to be disadvantaged, tests of visual-spatial abilities have also been employed (Martens et al., 2006, study 2; McGlone & Aronson, 2006).

Other studies have focused on educational performance (Aronson et al., 2002) or intellectual abilities in African Americans (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn & Steele, 2001; Cadinu et al., 2003, study 2); Davis, Aronson & Salinas, 2006; Steele & Aronson, 1995 ) or Latinos (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Research has also examined stereotype threat among individuals with biracial identities (Shih, Bonam, Sanchez & Peck, 2007, study 3) and males whose academic or athletic identities were dominant in the setting (Yopyk & Prentice, 2005). However, not all studies have been focused on academic or intellectual performance. There have also been investigations of leadership opportunities (Davies, Spencer & Steele, 2005) and athletic ability (Stone & McWhinnie, 2008) in women, memory ability in older adults (Levy, 1996), childcare interactions of gay men (Bosson, Haymovitz & Pinel, 2004) and emotional sensitivity of men (Leyens, Désert, Croizet & Darcis, 2000; Marx & Stapel, 2006c; Marx & Stapel, 2006d).

The common finding among these studies is that a particular ability, trait, or pattern of behavior expected from a stereotype elicits confirmation of the stereotype from the group’s members.

A common theoretical explanation of this phenomenon has been in terms of Heider’s (1958) balance theory and theories of cognitive consistency (Nosek, Banaji & Greenwald, 2002; Rydel et al., 2009; Schmader, Johns & Forbes, 2008). According to these models, stereotype threat originates in cognitive inconsistency between the relations among three components—the domain, the self, and the stereotyped group. These three relations may be viewed as one’s self-concept with respect to a given domain, one’s social identity with respect to a given social group, and the implications of the group stereotype for performance in the domain. For example, if the domain of mathematics is one valued by a woman, who identifies with her gender, and the stereotype of women suggests poor mathematical ability, there will be a state of inconsistency between wanting to perform well in the domain and the stereotype suggesting that women will do poorly. Recognition by the individual of cognitive inconsistency among these relations results in a revised assessment of the situation or behavior changes (e.g., "the test was biased,") that restore a state of cognitive consistency. This process of recognizing cognitive inconsistency and trying to restore a balanced state is then thought to undermine performance due to interference and competition for cognitive resources in working memory by these inconsistent and arousing thoughts (Schmader & Johns, 2003; Schmader et al, 2008).

Domain identification refers to whether competency in the domain is meaningful and important to the individual's self-concept. It is basically a truism in stereotype threat research that the individual must be identified with the domain to experience stereotype threat. For this reason, studies have often pre-screened participants based on domain importance (Ben-Zeev et al., 2005; Brown & Pinel, 2003; Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; Schmader et al., 2004), domain ability or achievement (Martens et al., 2006; Schmader, 2002; Schmader & Johns, 2003) or both importance and ability (Aronson et al., 1999; Davies et al., 2002; Marx & Roman, 2002; Spencer et al., 1999). A meta-analysis by Walton and Cohen (2003) obtained further support for the importance of domain identification in stereotype threat studies. They found that effects were significantly stronger, and about three times larger in magnitude, for those studies that pre-selected participants who were identified with the domain compared to those that were not. Additionally, a number of studies have obtained evidence for the moderating role of domain identification by examining its effect on stereotype threat directly, and finding threat primarily in individuals highly identified with it (Aronson et al., 1999; Cadinu et al., 2003; Gresky et al., 2005; Lesko & Corpus, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000; Pronin, Steele & Ross, 2004).

The perceived relation between the domain and the self is determined by both the person's identification with the domain and the diagnostic accuracy of an evaluative measure. Major and Schmader (1998) make this distinction in presenting two ways different ways in which the individual may react to negative academic experiences. Both facilitate self esteem and manifest themselves as reactions to stereotype threat. One of these is to devalue the domain, rendering it as unimportant to the self. This response may represent a temporary reaction to the situation, such as within the stereotype threat setting (Davies, Spencer, Quinn & Gerhardstein, 2002, study 3; Rosenthal and Crisp, 2006, study 1), or a more permanent, chronic form of disengagement from the domain. Whereas the former may not have long-term effects, the latter represents a much more destructive form of disengagement that could have life-changing ramifications. Alternatively, one could discount the relevance of feedback by denying that a particular test or experience truly represents an assessment of one’s ability (Lesko & Corpus, 2006). If it is not a valid measure of the ability in question then there is no real threat at hand.

Another aspect of the self thought to moderate stereotype threat is the degree of identification with the stereotyped group. Cognitive consistency theories predict that a higher degree of identification with a negatively stereotyped group should yield greater cognitive inconsistency or imbalance. A number of studies have indeed shown a direct relationship between stereotype threat effects and measures of group identification (Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007b; Schmader, 2002) and stigma consciousness (Brown & Pinel, 2003). However, the use of different measures for these constructs has sometimes failed to validate this relationship or found enhanced performance among more highly identified African Americans (Davis et al., 2006; Mendoza-Denton, Petrzak & Downey, 2008, study 3b).

One important factor to consider with respect to measures of either domain or group identification is the point at which such measures are obtained. Whereas greater identification should enhance stereotype threat effects, changing one’s perceptions of these relationships may serve to restore cognitive consistency and reduce stereotype threat. Thus, some studies have found that stereotype threat resulted in short-term increases in domain (Kiefer and Sekaquaptewa, 2007a) or group (Marx et al., 2005, study 2) identification. For example, Marx et al. found that women rated gender as more important to their identity and as a bigger part of themselves under stereotype threat conditions than a non-diagnostic control. They also had lower expectancies of success on a math test. These findings are not unexpected because heightened salience of a stereotyped group identity is a necessary condition for stereotype threat. By activating this identity the threat is elicited. Moreover, once elicited, the individual is thought to ruminate on the provocative cognitions (Schmader et al., 2008), further activating them in memory. If a restructuring of these cognitions is successful in reducing cognitive inconsistency, however, identification with the domain or group may then be reduced. Opposite relationships may result depending on when identification is assessed (see McFarland, Lev-Arey & Ziegert, 2003).

A demonstration of how highly identified individuals might modify their self identities in response to stereotype threat is provided by Pronin et al. (2004). In the first of several studies, they measured women’s self ratings on gender stereotypic traits and found that the women who had completed more quantitative subjects in school showed a pattern of self perception that they termed identity bifurcation. This phenomenon manifests itself in dissociation from those stereotypic traits that are related negatively to perceived success in the domain. Pronin et al. found not only that those women more highly identified with the domain rated themselves lower on these attributes, but in subsequent studies it was seen that manipulating stereotype threat resulted in situationally induced identity bifurcation. Thus, selectively differentiating oneself from the stereotyped group appears to provide one means of reducing stereotype threat and the cognitive inconsistency thought to underlie it.

Although stereotype threat was originally viewed in terms of how one’s behavior might make the “stereotype more plausible as a self-characterization in the eyes of others, and perhaps even in one's own eyes” (Steele & Aronson, 1995, p. 797, emphasis added), the effect occurs even when one’s behavior remains private (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; Wout, Danso, Jackson and Spencer, 2008). Assessment by others does not appear to be a necessary condition for stereotype threat and it may reflect a relatively private and personal reaction to the setting.

Despite the existence of stereotype threat as a private phenomenon, one can differentiate between threats to the individual and collective selves (Gaertner, Sedikides & Graetz, 1999; Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea & Iuzzini, 2002). Wout, et al. (2008) argued that past research has often confounded these manipulations. They employed different experimental conditions in separating these threats. In a self-threat group, female participants took a math test that assessed their personal mathematical competency. These women graded their own tests and kept scores to themselves, making performance a private matter. A second, group-threat, condition was told the purpose of the test was to assess gender differences in math ability and that no personally identifying information was being collected, only the person’s gender. Thus, performance, although private regarding the self, had implications for a group with whom they identified. Although in the first of multiple studies, evidence of stereotype threat appeared only in the self-threat group, in a subsequent study, Wout el al. found evidence of depressed performance in the group-threat condition as well. However, this effect occurred only among participants who were highly identified with the group. This research suggests that more than one type of process might be operative in test settings and that the two need to be distinguished in future studies. Although self-threat was consistently found to depress performance, group-based threat required a particularly strong collective identity related to the social category.

The experience of stereotype threat is a subjective one and depends on how the individual interprets the situational context. In some cases, different interpretations may be possible. For instance, Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling and Darley (1999) were able to negatively impact the performance of white participants by telling them a golf game was a test of athletic ability whereas African Americans’ performances were impaired by telling them the same game was a test of sports intelligence. In this manner, the ambiguity of the behavioral context allowed for direct manipulation of the domain’s interpretation and its relevance to different racial stereotypes across experimental conditions, each playing to a different racial stereotype.

Other studies have not tried to modify the perceived domain per se, but rather, its perceived relationship to the stereotyped group. For example, Ben-Zeev et al. (2005) told participants in a no-threat condition that a standardized math test was chosen for the study specifically because prior research had found no differences in how men and women performed on the test. Similarly, a number of other studies have reduced threat, and enhanced performance, by describing the same test as culturally unbiased or lacking group differences (Blascovich et al., 2001; Brown & Pinel, 2003; O’Brien & Crandall, 2003; Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999). The assumed causes for such relationships also appear to be important. Thoman et al. (2008) found that attributing gender differences in quantitative test scores to an innate superiority of men reduced women’s performance compared to a condition where differences were attributed to difference in effort.

Once the domain has been assessed, the accessibility and applicability of a given stereotype may be strongly determined. For this reason, stereotype threat may arise even in the absence of specific invocation of the stereotype. Smith and White (2002, study 1), for instance, assessed the extent to which unfavorable stereotypes regarding the mathematical ability of white women (compared to men, study 1) and white men (compared to Asians, study 2) must be explicitly mentioned to invoke stereotype threat. Three groups were used in the study. In one case, no specific stereotype was mentioned and threat was assumed to be elicited implicitly. A second group read a seemingly credible article that argued for differences in mathematical abilities consistent with the stereotype and was told the test they would be taking had shown similar results. In this condition the stereotype was explicitly presented. Finally, a third group was treated the same as the explicit-stereotype condition but was told that the present test had not shown a pattern of differences consistent with the stereotype. This was the nullified-stereotype condition. The basic findings of these studies were that both implicit-stereotype and explicit-stereotype groups displayed poorer test performance than the nullified-stereotype group but comparable performance with respect to each other. In other words, the stereotype did not have to be explicitly mentioned to elicit stereotype threat, because it was, presumably, already accessible in the minds of the participants.

Even stronger evidence for the pervasive salience of stereotypic beliefs within these settings is provided by Walton and Cohen (2003). In their meta-analysis of stereotype lift (a bolstering rather than disruption of performance) and stereotype threat research, they found that effect sizes were much larger in those studies that negated the stereotype rather than simply leaving the domain-group relationship unspecified. This analysis further supports the idea that people may inherently perceive the relevance of applicable stereotypes based on contextual cues and their own membership in the stereotyped group. It also provides more compelling results than those provided by any single study. However, what many of these studies lack is the use of implicit measures of stereotype activation in addition to performance outcome measures. Knowing the strength and content of stereotype activation in these studies would greatly aid in their interpretation.

One reason stereotype threat may result even in the absence of strong contextual cues relating to the stereotype may be that classification in terms of highly salient physical characteristics, such as gender, skin color or age, occurs automatically, independently of one’s conscious goals (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). The composition of individuals within the setting alone can affect the salience of these characteristics (Taylor, 1981). A number of studies have manipulated stereotype threat by placing the participant into a solo or minority status within the larger group (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003; Sekaquaptewa, Waldman & Thompson, 2007). Such numerical distinctiveness on the part of the individual appears to heighten awareness as a minority group member and salience of the accompanying stereotype.

A number of different manipulations have been tested by researchers as ways of reducing stereotype threat research. One is the presentation of positive role models or exemplars. Schmader et al. (2008) argue that positive exemplars, or portrayals of stereotype-disconfirming group members, may provide one means of changing the negative relationship between the group and the domain to one that is positive in valence. Studies show that presenting positive exemplars prior to assessment reduces the performance decrements associated with stereotype threat (Marx & Roman, 2002; McIntyre, Paulson & Lord, 2003; McIntyre et al., 2005). However, these effects have not always been exemplars related to the domain under study. In one study, for example, McIntyre et al. (2003, study 2) found that presenting descriptions of successful women in various fields other than mathematics resulted in better math performance than that found among women reading about successful corporations. Because these positive portrayals of successful women were not directly related to the domain in question, they do not appear to be interpretable in terms of modified beliefs regarding the stereotyped group’s competency.

Another strategy for reducing stereotype threat is self-affirmation. Martens et al. (2006, study 1) had participants in a self-affirmation condition rank order 11 characteristics or values that were personally important to them and then write about the highest ranked attribute. In a non-affirmation condition instructions were to choose the item ranked ninth and to write about its importance to other people rather than from their own personal perspective. Women in the affirmation condition showed relief from stereotype threat on a math test compared to those in the non-affirmation condition and compared to male participants.

Gresky et al. (2005) also manipulated the salience of particular aspects of participants' self-concepts. They found that constructing self-concept maps with many nodes by highly math-identified women bolstered test performance compared to those who constructed maps with few nodes or who did not construct self-concept maps. Similarly, Ambady et al. (2004) asked women undergraduates to answer personal questions about themselves, to list positive and negative characteristics of themselves, and to provide examples from their lives for each characteristic listed. The authors viewed this manipulation as fostering individuation and had half of the women perform this task. Additionally, in order to manipulate stereotype threat, the women were either subliminally primed with female word associates or neutral words beforehand. As predicted, the individuation task alleviated the performance impairment among women primed with the female words.

All of these interventions involved manipulations performed prior to the assessment task and presumably prevented the elicitation of stereotype threat. However, is it possible to actively suppress its expression after the fact? Unfortunately, this approach does not appear likely to succeed, at least without considerable effort. Active suppression of unwanted thoughts may further activate the very thoughts that one is attempting to suppress and lead to rebound effects (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Jetten, 1994; Wegner, 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987). Furthermore, the thoughts used to suppress the stereotype’s application may adversely impact the individual’s ability to process other, non-stereotypic information (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1996) and interfere with performance in the stereotype threat setting (Schmader et al., 2008). On the other hand, given repeated training at suppression strategies, it may be possible to achieve some success by eventual conversion of what began as conscious suppression of a stereotype into a relatively effortless automatic activity.

In contrast to the active suppression of interfering thoughts, the operation of inhibitory processes is likely to offer a less effortful, preconscious means of preventing the activation of stereotypes or other threat-inducing cognitions without commandeering working memory resources critical to performance (see Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998 for a discussion of the distinction between category suppression and inhibition). Moskowitz, Gollwitzer and Schaal (1999) found evidence, for example, of the preconscious inhibition of stereotypes by chronic egalitarian goals. It is also possible to inhibit the activation of a stereotype or other category in memory by activating other competing categories (Dunn & Spellman, 2003; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004). For example, Macrae, Bodenhausen and Milne, (1995) had participants view a Chinese woman after subliminal priming of words related to either the female stereotype or others related to her Chinese ancestry. In a subsequent lexical decision task not only were reaction times to words related to the primed stereotype faster than neutral words but those related to the unprimed category were actually slower than the control, thereby demonstrating actual inhibition as well as facilitation of categorical representations in memory.

Through a change in the activation of alternate social identities from one having negative implications for performance in a setting to one having more positive implications, category inhibition may provide a basis for preventing stereotype threat. Indeed, a number of studies show that experimentally manipulated changes in the relative salience of alternate social identities moderate stereotype threat (Ambady et al., 2001; Gresky et al., 2005; McGlone & Aronson, 2006; Neuville & Croizet, 2007; Rydell, McConnell and Beilock, 2009; Shih et al., 1999; Yopyk & Prentice, 2005, study 1) and self-stereotyping (Sinclair, Hardin & Lowery, 2006; Sinclair & Lun, 2006).

One example is provided by Shih et al. (1999). They varied the salience of different stereotypes associated with Asian-American women by either priming the categories of ethnicity or gender. They found that the participants performed the worst on a math test when the gender stereotype was primed, best when the Asian stereotype was primed, and midway between these conditions for a control group. Activation of different stereotypes—one with negative implications for performance and one with positive implications—yielded opposite effects that were consistent with the stereotype. Thus, a shift in identity can reduce stereotype threat if that identity has opposite implications for performance.

This research suggests that interventions aimed at modifying the relative salience of different stereotypes and social identities may provide an effective means of preventing the emergence of stereotype threat. Further research into category inhibition as a basis for interventions in this area are warranted. Moreover, category activation and inhibition may ultimately underlie many of the past interventions proposed for stereotype threat.

For more information about stereotype threat visit ReducingStereotypeThreat.org.